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THE CRISIS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA
BY HAROLD J. BERMAN *
Address delivered at the Dedication of the James Warren Smith**
Memorial Wing of Stuart Hall, Boston College Law School
April 28, 1984
A dedication such as this is a historic occasion, in a double sense of the word
"historic." It looks both to the future and to the past.
As teachers and students, officers, alumni, and friends of Boston College Law School,
you are here partly to celebrate a renewal of your own community, your own common
purposes. Even an outsider can sense the pride and joy of this occasion, when a commu-
nity comes together and, in the name of dedicating a building, re-dedicates itself.
Such a re-dedication looks not only to the future but also to the past. Someone has
said that a historian is a prophet in reverse. By the same token, a prophet is a historian in
reverse: he is concerned with the historical significance of the new age that he proclaims.
In reading the signs of the times, he divides the future from the past and thereby helps to
orient us toward both.
And so those who wish to dedicate an important new building give it a name, and the
choice of that name may tell something about the direction, from past to future, that the
community is taking.
I regret very much that I did not have the privilege to know James Warren Smith
personally. I know that he was a beloved and a gifted teacher. I know also that he was a
person of great public spirit who made many contributions to the Commonwealth and to
its legal system. He was devoted to the law — both the law in action and the law as a system
of thought. And finally, he was a deeply religious person whose professional life and
work, including his teaching, were strongly motivated by his religious faith.
James Warren Smith serves as a source of inspiration, not only in a general sense, but
more specifically as a source of strength in meeting the critical problems that have
confronted legal education in the United States for the past forty years, and have now
brought it, in my view, to a real crisis.
When I speak of a crisis of legal education in America, I do not mean that law
students are not studying hard; nor do I mean that law teachers are less diligent or less
able than they ought to be or than they were. So far as 1 can judge, the law students who
graduate in 1984 will not be noticeably less skillful or knowledgeable in the practice of law
than their predecessors.
* Harold J. Berman delivered the memorial address. On January 1, 1985, Professor Berman
became James Barr Ames Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard Law School, and Woodruff Professor
of Law, Emory University School of Law.
** James Warren Smith (1930-1982) had been a professor at Boston College Law School since
1958.
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Nor am I referring to the criticism that law students today are not receiving sufficient
training in how to serve the public interest. It may be true, as President Bok of Harvard
University has written, that we need more educational programs that would prepare
prospective practitioners and legislators to expand the delivery of legal services to the
poor, to develop new, less expensive and less acrimonious methods of dispute resolution,
and to explore new ways to finance efforts to raise industrial productivity and combat
pollution, crime, poverty, and other social ills. Nevertheless, our inadequacies in these
respects hardly constitute a genuine crisis of American legal education, since ultimately the
law schools can only play a relatively small part in the achievement of needed reforms in
these areas.
The crisis of which I speak is a crisis of attitudes toward law and a crisis of legal
thought. Law teachers and law students of 1984 are more one sided, and more mistaken,
in their view of the nature of law than were their predecessors in any other period of
American history.
We have been overwhelmed by the belief that law is politics and politics in a rather
narrow sense: not in the sense that Aristotle meant when he said law is politics, but more
in the sense that Max Weber and V.I. Lenin meant when they said that law is politics,
namely, domination. It is widely accepted in our law schools that law is essentially
something that is made by political authorities, including legislators, judges, and adminis-
trators, to effectuate their policies; that law is essentially a means of social engineering;
that law is essentially a pragmatic device, an instrument, used by those in power to
accomplish their will. Of course law is all that. But it is not solely that — it is not essentially
that. What is omitted from the prevailing view is a belief that law is rooted in something
bigger than the people who hand it down — that law is rooted in history and in the moral
order of the universe.
Of course, law is politics. But law is also morality. And law is also history. Law is not
only something that is made by those who are in power; law is also something that is given.
The legislators and judges are not only its masters. They are also its creatures.
In American law schools today, reference is rarely made to the sources of our legal
tradition in the religious convictions of our ancestors, both Jewish and Christian. It is
simply not mentioned that, historically, all the legal systems of the West emerged in
response to a belief in the lawful character of the universe and in the fundamental
purpose of law to guide men and women to salvation. The king, said Bracton in the early
13th century, is under the law, and both are under God. At about the same time, in the
first lawbook ever written in the German language, the Sachsenspiegel, it was said, "God is
himself the law, and therefore law is dear to Him." Without the fear of purgatory and the
hope of the last judgment, the Western legal tradition would not have come into being.
Admittedly these historical truths, which are not taught today, were also not gener-
ally taught in American law schools one hundred or one hundred and fifty years ago. But
then they were taught in the homes and in the churches. They were taken for granted.
They were part of the public philosophy. Indeed, throughout the nineteenth and into the
first decades of the twentieth century American lawyers learned their law chiefly from
Blackstone, who wrote that "Mlle law of nature ... dictated by God himself is binding
. . . in all countries and at all times; no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this;
and such of them as are valid derive all force and all their authority, mediately or
immediately, from this original."
Only in the past two generations, in my lifetime, has the public philosophy of
America shifted radically from a religious to a secular theory of law, from a moral to a
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political or instrumental theory, and from a historical to a pragmatic theory. Law is now
generally considered to be simply a device for accomplishing specific political, economic,
and social objectives. The tasks of law are thought to be finite, material, and impersonal—
to get things done, to make people act in certain ways. Rarely does one hear it said that law
is a reflection of an objective justice or of the ultimate meaning or purpose of life. Usually
it is thought to reflect at best the community sense of what is expedient; and more
commonly it is thought to express the more or less arbitrary will of the lawmaker.
The shift in public philosophy has changed the context in which law is taught. Even
when we teach the same cases, the same rules, the same theories, that were taught sixty or
a hundred years ago, they have a different meaning. For example, Christopher Columbus
Langdell, who in the 1870s collected for the first time cases on contracts, combining the
actions of debt, assumpsit, and various other forms of" action and developing a set of
principles of general contract law, taught his students that his science of law had nothing
to do with justice. If it was justice they were interested in; one of his followers said, they
should go to the Divinity School! But Langdell — or at least his students — did believe in
justice, including divine justice; he simply believed also that it had nothing to do with
contracts. Now it is very different: today if a professor says that contract law has nothing
to do with justice, neither he nor his students are apt to have any idea of what justice is or
whether it exists.
But the changes go much deeper. We still use cases, but since there is not a belief in
the ongoing historical development of law over generations and centuries, the doctrine of
precedent has grown weaker and weaker, and the law that a case stands for no longer
seems to have objectivity. It is taught by some that any case can be decided any way — that
law is, basically, an argumentative technique. The judge, it is thought, decides on the basis
of his political, economic, or psychological prejudices; legal reasons are merely ra-
tionalizations. This used to be called "legal realism." Later it was developed into "policy
science." In more sophisticated forms it prevails widely in contemporary American legal
education, despite some important qualifications introduced by those who stress inherent
limitations imposed by the various aspects of what is called "the legal process."
It is interesting, in this connection, to go back over the introductory sections of law
school catalogues through the past eighty-five years. The Harvard Law School catalogue
of 1900 says that "the design of this school is to afford such a training in the fundamental
principles of English and American law as will constitute the best preparation for the
practice of the profession in any place where that system of law prevails." This formula,
which was repeated annually in subsequent catalogues, was a reference to the fundamen-
tal principles of English and American law as they had developed over many centuries.
Legal history provided the transcendent quality by which justice was to be found. The
1930 catalogue — Roscoe Pound was dean — is even more explicit: "The school," it states,
"seeks as its primary purpose to prepare for the practice of the legal profession wherever
the Common Law prevails. It seeks to train lawyers in the spirit of the common legal
heritage of the English-speaking people." More recently, however, this sentence has been
omitted and instead in the 1970s and until 1982 we have the following: "The school tries
to prepare its graduates to deal with legal problems as they arise wherever the common
law prevails." What has happened to the fundamental principles? What has happened to
the spirit of the common legal heritage? Finally, the phrase "Common Law" lost its initial
caps, and in the 1983-84 catalogue it disappeared altogether.
"No law school," said the Harvard Law School catalogue of 1970. "can today teach
with certainty the law which will be practiced by its graduates throughout their profes-
-
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sional lives. The school does seek to provide its students with a solid base of knowledge,
analytical skills, and insight which will enable them to perform effectively as laws and legal
institutions continue to change around them." There you have the contemporary crisis in
American legal education. We are unable to identify a common purpose other than
training in the kind of "knowledge, analytical skills, and insight" that are needed to
"perform effectively" as lawyers. One who has learned to "perform like a lawyer" will be
able, we suppose, to analyze any legal problem that may arise in a world in flux, a world in
which law is always a means to other ends, a world in which the concepts of an objective
moral law and an ongoing legal tradition no longer carry great weight.
The triumph of the positivist theory of law — that law is the will of the lawmaker —
and the decline of rival theories — the moral theory that law is reason and conscience, and
the historical theory that law is an ongoing tradition in which both politics and morality
play important parts — have contributed to the bewilderment of legal education. Skepti-
cism and relativism are widespread. Only a few are sure what has to be taught. We go on
using cases as the primary material of instruction, but we hardly even teach the doctrine
of precedent. We go on offering basic courses in contracts and torts in the first year, but
many teachers of these subjects spend a good deal of time proving that there really is no
such thing as a "law of contracts" or a "law of torts."
Meanwhile, after taking "basic" courses in the old "common law" (now in lower case)
during the first year, the student is confronted with an enormous array of choices. To give
an idea of the nature of change, let me say that when I first came onto the Harvard Law
School faculty 36 years ago, all courses in the first and second year were required, and at
least one course in the third year was required. In those days there was something called
"law" and people knew what it was! Today the 1983-84 Harvard Law School catalogue
lists over 240 different courses and seminars — that is, courses and seminars in 240
different legal subjects! We have moved beyond the legal pragmatism of Justice Holmes,
who said that law is a prediction of what courts will do, to the ultimate in legal prag-
matism, that law is a prediction of what lawyers will do. Someone has said of pragmatism
that it is fine in theory but it doesn't work in practice.
Concentration on the instrumental character of law — law as a means, whether a
means of social control in the broad sense, or a means of effectuating specific policies, or a
means of maintaining power, or whatever, but always as a means, never as an end in itself
— has contributed, I believe, to the fragmentation of the law school curriculum. If law is
essentially an instrument of politics, there is very little in society to which it is alien, and by
the same token there is very little in law that is unique or required. Its nature is shaped by
the other ends which it serves. It tends to become, therefore, an infinite series of practical
solutions to social problems.
Under these circumstances, it should not be surprising that in recent years a group of
law professors has emerged that is demanding a thorough and open "politicization" of law
teaching. These critics ask the law schools to devote themselves, on the one hand, to
exposing the fundamentally exploitative — and also the inherently self-contradictory —
character of all law, and, on the other hand, to transforming our existing legal system into
an instrument of rapid social change in the direction of an egalitarian society. Since for
them "law is politics" — in the Weberian or Leninist sense — some of them advocate the
open use of militant political tactics in order to "seize power" (as they put it) within the law
school community. Thus the dominant pragmatist, instrumental, and utilitarian theory of
law has paved the way for the emergence of a band of revolutionaries who combine
nihilism with utopianism.
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It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the crisis of American legal education
consists of this radical attack upon the liberal establishment. The heart of the crisis, in my
view, is not in the radical attack but in the liberalism that is being attacked. For two
generations liberalism has taught that law is essentially a pragmatic instrument of public
policy. The legal process as a whole has been reduced by this to what in reality is only one
of its major aspects. Now the pragmatists are being hoist, so to speak, by their own petard.
Obviously, the problems that are being confronted in American legal education
today, including the crisis of legal thought, are part of a much larger movement of
history. The traditional Western beliefs in the structural integrity of law, its ongoingness,
its religious roots, its transcendent qualities, are disappearing not only from the minds of
law teachers and law students but also from the consciousness of the vast majority of
citizens, the people as a whole; and more than that, they are disappearing from the law
itself. The law itself is becoming more fragmented, more subjective, geared more to
expediency and less to morality, concerned more with immediate consequences and less
with consistency or continuity. The historical soil of the Western legal tradition is being
washed away in the twentieth century, and the tradition itself is threatened with collapse.
In part, the crisis of legal education is due to the radical centralization and bureau-
cratization of economic life, of which socialism in one form or another is an aspect or a
consequence. Whole new branches of public law have emerged in areas such as taxation,
securities regulation, administrative law of a dozen different kinds. Also the radical
changes that have taken place in constitutional law during the past 30 years have had
enormous repercussions throughout the law. The center of gravity of the legal system has
shifted, and the background of legal ideas, the very style of legal Winking, which was
characteristic of previous centuries seems to be increasingly irrelevant. We have moved
from an individualistic to a collectivistic age.
If what we are experiencing in the 20th century — in many countries — were,
indeed, only an economic and a technological revolution, or even only a political revolu-
tion, we should be able to adapt our legal institutions and our system of legal education to
meet the new demands placed upon them, as we have clone in revolutionary situations in
the past. After the American and French Revolutions of 200 years ago, after the English
Revolution of 350 years ago, after the Lutheran and Calvinist Reformations of the early
sixteenth century, after the Papal Revolution (the Gregorian Reformation) of the late
1 I th and early 12th centuries, the law eventually caught up with the changes and legal
science, legal education, adapted itself to them. Our difficulty, however, is greater than in
the past. Today we are threatened by a deep cynicism about the law, which has penetrated
all classes of the population. And it is this threat that makes the crisis of legal education so
important — and so acute.
The story is told of a man who was hanging on the limb of a tree extending over a
canyon. He could not raise himself onto the limb and gradually his grip grew weaker and
he looked up to the heavens and called, "If there is anyone up there, please help, help!" A
voice came booming out over the canyon, "I am here. I can save you if you have faith."
"Yes, yes, I have faith. I will do anything," shouted the man. "If you have faith you will let
go of the branch," said the voice. The man looked out over the canyon and then turned
again to the heavens and shouted, "Is there anyone else up there?"
It may be impossible to restore the ancient Judaic and Christian foundations of our
legal tradition. But it is important, first, to recognize that it is the disappearance of those
religious foundations that gives power to the convictions of the utopian nihilists — power
possibly to overcome the superficial utilitarianism of the liberal establishment. The skep-
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tics, especially, should feel some nostalgia for a time when justice seemed sure and history
had meaning. Let them, at least, cry out, "Is there anyone else up there?"
Second, we must restore the integrity of our jurisprudential heritage. We must
re-combine the separate strands of legal thought that were once wound together:
positivism, natural-law theory, and historical jurisprudence. It is a recognition of the
historical dimension of law, in my opinion, above all, that we must re-capture in order to
restore the creative tensions between politics and morals. We shall not achieve social
justice without a strong sense of legality, and we shall not recover a strong sense of legality
without an integrative jurisprudence that finds the sources of our law not only in politics
but also in history, in human nature, and in the universe itself.
